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State of Emergency and Constitutional Reform
Andrej Zwitter, Phd*
Ever since the creation of constitutions that recognize the concept of states of emergency, dictatorial regimes have used emergency powers to consolidate their position. This is not to say that the legal mechanism of the state of emergency exists only in those regimes. On the contrary, the 
state of emergency is a feature of the democratic state.1 Particularly during natural 
disasters (e.g., wildfires, tornadoes, etc.), governors in the United States declare 
states of emergency in the form of executive orders as a means of accessing federal 
emergency funds and/or mobilizing the National Guard. Because of this admin-
istrative function, state-of-emergency declarations happen in the United States 
more frequently than in other countries.2 Clearly, such declarations are subject to 
consideration by the executive branch. Its consideration is based on whether an 
event can be handled within the boundaries of ordinary laws and regulations or 
whether it requires emergency powers.
The strategic role of states of emergency imposed by repressive regimes, 
however, remains undisputed. Thus, although in a general emergency, laws are for 
the most part designed to give an extraordinary measure of flexibility and ex-
tended reach to the executive to cope with a crisis, their effective use and duration 
can suggest different goals, such as the repression of a regime’s enemies. Taking a 
look at the countries that recently experienced what is by now commonly known 
as the “Arab Spring,” one finds that states of emergency were often put in place to
• stabilize a political leadership that had lost (or never had) popular legitimacy,
• preventively deter protests and unrests by threatening martial-law sanctions,
• crack down on unwanted opposition and defenders of human rights, and
• circumvent human rights obligations that would otherwise limit administrative
detention and other powers of security and military forces.
Constitutionalism was a central theme in the Middle East / North Africa region 
at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century.3 It needed 
*The author is chair for International Relations at the Department of Legal Theory, University of Gron-
ingen, the Netherlands. Egyptian diplomats and Tunisian political parties have consulted him on matters of 
constitutional reform and state-of-emergency regulations in North Africa.
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the Arab Spring to trigger new reform processes. With that phenomenon, start-
ing in Tunisia in January 2011, the Middle East / North Africa in particular now 
experiences an unprecedented wave of political and constitutional reforms. If the 
latter are indeed to lead to more democratic and liberal states, then one of the 
crucial tests remains how nations perform in states of emergency.
This article presents current constitutional developments in the context of 
the Arab Spring, analyzing the prospects of democratic control and the rule of law 
from the view of constitutional arrangements concerning states of emergency. 
Each section briefly outlines the political and legal background of the country 
under consideration and then examines legal norms concerning the state of emer-
gency. Countries covered for the purposes of this article are those that, due to the 
Arab Spring, are engaged in large-scale processes of constitutional reform: Egypt, 
Libya, and Tunisia. First, though, the article identifies key elements of checks and 
balances that derive from the principles of democracy and the rule of law for 
emergency regulations.
Conditions of the Rule of Law and Democracy
Emergencies require states to act faster (with urgency) and/or more effec-
tively (better) than is possible within limitations imposed by the law during nor-
mal conditions. Typically, we observe that dictatorial regimes can enact ad hoc 
legislation for concrete problems of the executive; processes of legislative decision 
making and execution are faster since no majority consensus is necessary; and 
checks and balances exert little control on the executive.4
If this is a recipe for effectiveness and efficiency, then liberal democracies 
have mainly four tools at their disposal to deal with emergencies:
1. moving legislative power to the executive;
2. granting extended administrative power to the executive (vis-à-vis the rights of the
citizen);
3. reducing the democratic control (checks and balances) over the executive;
4. installing accelerated judicial procedures (e.g., the martial law norm that civilians can
be tried before military courts).5
This results in the paradox that in order to protect the democratic state in times 
of crisis, the state has to become less democratic. In order for democracy to sur-
vive its state-of-emergency regime, modern constitutions impose limitations on 
emergency powers, particularly through the principles of democratic control, ur-
gency, proportionality, and the rule of law.6 As one may observe in the Arab Spring 
countries, authoritarian regimes tend to violate these principles during states of 
emergency through the unnecessary declaration, the undue extension of emer-
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gency status, and/or the disproportional use of emergency powers. This is possible 
because constitutional checks and balances are not in place. The constitutional 
checks and balances that democracies have at their disposal to limit the abuse of 
emergency powers are as follows:
• parliamentary and/or judicial control of the executive’s emergency powers,
• necessity of the actions taken under or the extent of emergency powers,
• proportionality of emergency powers to the extent of the threat posed by
the emergency,
• time limit of emergency powers,
• guaranties against changing formal (i.e., laws that enable emergency powers)
laws and constitutional law in general,
• limited executive-legislation powers, and
• preservation of civil liberties.
The principal question addressed by this article is thus whether the constitutional 
reforms triggered by the Arab Spring will improve emergency regulations by 
making them less prone to misuse. The following case studies illustrate the con-
stitutional-reform processes and proposals for reforming state-of-emergency 
laws.
Egypt
Egypt is one of the most prominent cases of the misuse of emergency laws. 
Effectively, Egypt has remained under declaration of a state of emergency since 
the Arab-Israeli War of 1967. The state of emergency was lifted for an 18-month 
period in 1980 but was reimposed after Anwar Sadat’s assassination in 1981. The 
state of emergency in Egypt derived from the Egyptian constitution and since 30 
March 2011, from the constitutional declaration adopted by the Supreme Coun-
cil of Armed Forces (SCAF).7
Both the constitution in the version of 2007 and the 2011 constitutional 
declaration referred to general law to determine the manner in which an emer-
gency is declared (see Article 148, 2007 constitution, and Article 59, 2011 consti-
tutional declaration). Notwithstanding calls from the European Union to end the 
state of emergency in full before the presidential elections on 23 May 2012, legal 
analyst Nathan Brown had already predicted that the SCAF would keep the state 
of emergency partially in force for some areas to prevent thuggery until it expired 
automatically on 1 June 2012.8
The automatic end of the state of emergency did not abolish the material law 
that guides its execution, which, as shown below, remains a serious concern. Fur-
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thermore, on 13 June 2012, Decree 4991/2012 was released, allowing military 
forces to detain people who violate certain provisions of the penal code (other-
wise, only the police are permitted to do so) and thus fill a legal void until adop-
tion of the new constitution.9 This action raised fears among human rights activ-
ists that the dreaded state-of-emergency norms would creep back into the new 
state.10
Regarding the constitutional drafting process, oppositional groups heavily 
disputed the legitimacy of the Constituent Assembly as 12 liberals withdrew from 
it on 16 November 2012 after five Copts had already withdrawn. These withdraw-
als were the result of the Muslim Brotherhood not allowing discussion of all ar-
ticles of the new constitution in the assembly.11 Furthermore, on 22 November 
President Mohammed Morsi issued a decree giving himself sweeping powers. 
One can see the reasons for this decree in the need to bring increasing instability 
under control and to counteract the Cairo Administrative Court’s referral of a 
case concerning the legality of the Constituent Assembly to the Supreme Consti-
tutional Court. According to Article VI of the decree, “The President may take 
the necessary actions and measures to protect the country and the goals of the 
revolution.”12 Morsi’s decisions were to be final until election of the new parlia-
ment and not subject to appeal, according to Article II, but political pressure later 
forced him to withdraw from this hard-line position.13
Egypt’s new constitution (2012) was signed into law by President Morsi on 
26 December 2012 after two rounds of polling resulting in an approval rate of 63 
percent and a turnout of only 30 percent.14 After a military-supported popular 
coup d’état, the Egyptian constitution, in force for six months, was suspended by 
the army, which also ousted the Muslim Brotherhood’s president on 3 July 2013.15 
New interim president Adly Mansour issued a provisional constitutional declara-
tion of 33 articles in force until the preparation of a revised constitution on the 
basis of the 2012 document.16 The Committee of Ten (10 constitutional experts 
and judges) handed to the president a radically redrafted constitution, which a 
Committee of Fifty would discuss.17 However, the legitimacy of the Committee 
of Fifty, which supposedly represented all societal stakeholders, was not entirely 
undisputed.18 Regarding presidential powers, Brown predicted that they
might be whittled down constitutionally a bit in the amendments. Even in early 2013, 
courts had begun to interpret its authority a bit restrictively and, for all the charges of 
“Brotherhoodization” of the state, Morsi hardly seemed to be able to exert much control 
over the military and security services. His successor—unless he comes from those parts 
of the state—is likely to fare no better.19
In the meantime, the interim presidency declared a state of emergency on 14 
August 2013 in order to provide the legal basis for the police to undertake two 
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raids to clear Muslim Brotherhood protest camps.20 These raids killed about 600 
and injured approximately 4,000 Morsi supporters.21
In 2006 President Hosni Mubarak promised to lift the state of emergency; 
instead, constitutional norms concerning the declaration of the emergency were 
amended, and it continued. Article 148—the key constitutional article guiding 
the declaration, presented on 26 February 2007 by a committee appointed by the 
SCAF—was amended in the revised constitution of 2007. It granted the presi-
dent the power to declare a state of emergency, which needed to be submitted to 
the People’s Assembly for a decision within 15 days. The fact that Article 148 did 
not impose an absolute time limit made the permanency of the state of emergency 
possible.22
The proposed amendments, included in the latest 2012 constitution, would 
restrict the ability to impose a lengthy state of emergency and assign an absolute 
time limit to the emergency period.23 The amended text of Article 148 reduced 
the time of submission of the declaration to the House of Representatives to 
seven days and, if dissolved, would provide the Shura Council (the upper house) 
with the power to decide upon continuation of the emergency declaration. Fur-
thermore, an absolute time limit of six months (extendable to one year upon pub-
lic referendum) had been introduced.24 By comparison, the old regulations al-
lowed the declaration to remain in force for up to three years.25 Despite these 
proposed amendments, which definitely improved parliamentary and popular 
control, it remains highly doubtful that such a constitutional regulation would 
satisfy both the requirements of checks and balances and the principles of the rule 
of law, as outlined above.
Emergency Law no. 162 of 1958—the material emergency law, triggered by 
a declaration of emergency—came into play again by a declaration of President 
Mansour on 13 August 2013 when clashes between Muslim Brotherhood sup-
porters and the police became more substantial.26 Among other provisions, this 
law provides the right to curb any civilian assembly, impose censorship, close 
stores, seize companies, and detain persons, forcing them to perform hard labor 
without trial for six months and fining them 40,000 Egyptian pounds (approxi-
mately $5,700 US).27 This implementation norm (Emergency Law no. 162 of 
1958) holds the greatest potential for abuse and human rights violations if it is 
reinstated in a similar manner after the reform processes conclude. Currently, 
developments concerning the government’s effort to create a new emergency law 
are hotly disputed. According to nongovernmental organizations and news re-
ports, the government intends simply to transfer many of the old regulations into 
ordinary criminal law and allow other regulations to remain the same while giving 
the law a new name: “Only in Egypt: you object to the Emergency Law, they 
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change its name to the ‘protecting society from criminals’ law; you object to that 
and its name becomes the ‘safeguarding the gains of the revolution’ law.”28
With regard to constitutional emergency powers, the Committee of Fifty 
will have to take a particularly close look at the 2012 constitution’s powers of the 
president that scholars and some Egyptian diplomats consider even more exten-
sive than those granted by the old constitution (compare Articles 101 [the right 
to propose laws], 104 [the right to object to laws], 146 [the right to declare war], 
147 [the right to appoint civil and military personnel], 148 [the right to invoke 
emergency powers, see above], and 150 [the right to call for a referendum]). If the 
SCAF can keep favorable constitutional provisions as they currently are and if a 
strong presidential system remains the other power in the state, then the political 
stability of Egypt might become structurally weak. Possible constitutional op-
tions, which could ameliorate this structural breaking point of political conflict, 
could reduce presidential powers in favor of a stronger ministerial system bal-
anced by parliamentary oversight (also over the military).
Moreover, the following articles surrounding state-of-emergency powers 
would need revision in order to comply with modern standards: 11 (regarding 
ethics, public morality, and public order); 48, paragraph two (censorship during 
war or public mobilization); 131 (the right to issue decrees with the force of law 
in urgent cases); and 215 (unclear role of a yet-to-be-established National Media 
Council). Article 131 in particular could prove dangerous since Morsi’s presiden-
tial decree foreshadowed a similar one that granted him absolute powers in No-
vember 2012 before the 2012 constitution came into force.
Libya
On 29 January 2011, Al Jazeera reported that the regime of Mu‘ammar Gad-
hafi in Libya had cancelled all football games, declaring a state of emergency and 
security alert at the beginning of the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt out of fear 
that the unrest could infect Libya as well.29 Around 20 February, protests esca-
lated in Libya leading to a de facto state of emergency due to internal armed 
conflict. At the end of February, Italy suspended a treaty of friendship forbidding 
warfare and military confrontation.30 On 17 March, the United Nations (UN) 
Security Council, acting under chapter 7 of the UN Charter, unanimously ad-
opted Resolution 1973, imposing a no-fly zone over Libya, the freezing of assets, 
and an arms embargo. Moreover, it authorized
member States that have notified the Secretary-General, acting nationally or through 
regional organizations or arrangements, and acting in cooperation with the Secretary-
General, to take all necessary measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 
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(2011), to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force 
of any form on any part of Libyan territory.31
On 27 October, the council decided unanimously to end the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Civilian Protection Mandate over Libya.32
The Kingdom of Libya was de facto established with the entry into force of 
the constitution on 7 October 1951, installing a constitutional and hereditary 
monarchy under King Idris. Given the time of its inception, this document was 
relatively progressive. As a control mechanism, it limited the king’s emergency 
powers by requiring approval of the parliament for their continuation.33
The Revolutionary Command Council issued the Constitutional Proclama-
tion of 1969, the legal document in force after the government of King Idris was 
overthrown in that year, intending to replace it with a real constitution.34 That 
never occurred, however. The Declaration on the Establishment of the Authority 
of the People, which created the General People’s Congress, existed parallel to the 
constitutional proclamation.35 That proclamation regulated both martial law (Ar-
ticle 24) and emergencies (Article 25): “The Revolutionary Command Council 
shall make decisions concerning martial law or the state of emergency whenever 
there is a threat to the internal or external security of the State and whenever the 
Revolutionary Command Council deems it necessary for the protection and de-
fense of the Revolution.”36
In addition to these two documents, the Green Book, which laid out Gadhafi’s 
political philosophy, also became a quasi-legal/quasi-religious fundament of the 
Libyan state—an obligatory source of study for all Libyans. According to the first 
volume, a system of popular congresses and people’s committees—replacing the 
parliamentary system—would lead to the ideal form of direct democracy in ac-
cordance with what Gadhafi called “Third Universal Theory.”37
Although not indicated otherwise, the end of the NATO mandate seemed 
to mark the end of the state of emergency de facto externally imposed by the 
conflict. De jure, however, one might assume that the state of emergency either 
formally ended with the dissolution of the General People’s Congress and the 
passing of the new “Constitutional Declaration” on 3 August 2011 (see below)—
or it did not end at all.38 A report in the April 2012 Malta Today clarified this 
constitutional confusion, noting that the Libyan government considered reinstat-
ing the state of emergency due to the risk of a renewed outbreak of violence.39 
Such a declaration would have to happen on the basis of the transitional docu-
ment, which Libya’s National Transitional Council passed on 3 August 2011 as a 
constitutional declaration, indicating no current declaration of a state of emer-
gency.40 Formally, this would be a bit problematic since the declaration does not 
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provide for emergency measures. The only basis of such a declaration would be 
Article 17, which in sentence three provides carte blanche in the form of a general 
clause: “The Transitional National Council shall be entrusted to guarantee the 
national unity, the safety of the national territory, to embody and circulate values 
and morals, to ensure the safety of citizens and expatriates, to ratify the interna-
tional agreements and to establish the bases of the civil constitutional democratic 
state.”41 A draft of a new emergency law had already been published by the in-
terim government, which, according to the Libya Herald, states that authorities 
are allowed to enact the following measures: “collect or confiscate weapons, am-
munition and explosives; declare a curfew; . . . arrest and detain anyone believed to 
be a threat to public security or who is a repeat offender; . . . intercept communica-
tions and impose controls on the media; [and] declare any area to a military zone 
under the control of a military commander.”42
On 14 November 2012, the first elected government of Libya was sworn in 
replacing the interim government.43 A month later, on 17 December, Russia Today 
reported that the new government had declared a state of emergency for the 
southern regions of Ghadames, Ghat, Obari, Al-Shati, Sebha, Murzuq, and Kufra 
in order to bring them back under government control.44 On 16 July 2013, the 
General National Congress—the successor of the National Transitional Coun-
cil—passed an electoral law to install the 60-member commission to draft the 
future constitution.45
Options for a draft constitution include using the 1951 constitution (in its 
form of 1963), which, according to Mohammed Ben Ghalbon, chairman of the 
Libyan Constitutional Union, has the advantage of already providing for a federal 
system and establishing the legal basis to reclaim Libya’s seat in the UN.46 Of 
course, many articles would have to be amended. Regarding use of the 1951 con-
stitution’s state-of-emergency regulations, two provisions are of especial concern: 
Article 70—which gave the king the right to proclaim a state of emergency with 
only the parliament to check upon the continuation of the declaration—does not 
contain further limitations or other checks and balances, such as time or propor-
tionality constraints. Furthermore, Article 195 would allow the suspension of 
constitutional provisions in times of emergency. Read in conjunction with Article 
70 and with a view to the experience with the Weimar Constitution, the latter 
provision could be used to dissolve the parliament altogether and install a perma-
nent state-of-emergency regime. This might require specific constitutional guar-
anties or, preferably, even the abolishment of Article 195. The federal-system op-
tion as provided by the 1951 constitution (removed by the 1963 amendments, 
which led to severe social instabilities), however, might offer a way out of the 
political deadlock caused by tribal politics and regional militias claiming their 
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own role in the political process. But this option would prove viable only if it ac-
counts for the political and economic changes of the last 60 years.47
Tunisia
Tunisia is a case of exception to the rule when it comes to the use and misuse 
of emergency powers. Although the country is ruled by an autocratic regime, 
President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali’s powers did not stem from a continuation of 
emergency law to limit parliamentary control and extend executive powers. Be-
fore the latest revolution, the last instance of a state of emergency was the Bread 
Riots of 1984, under President Habib Bourguiba’s regime. After the government 
declared that prices for bread and other cereals would double and in protest of the 
repressive practices of the regime, turmoil began on 1 January 1984 all over the 
country. A demoralized police force appeared unable to control the protests, so on 
3 January, declaration of a state of emergency allowed the deployment of army 
units, which used automatic weapons against crowds and barricaded the streets of 
Tunis to curtail violence, lootings, and destruction of symbols of the regime. Ac-
cording to reports, 89 Tunisians died in the disturbances, at least 938 others were 
injured, and more than 1,000 were arrested.48 Prime Minister Mohammed Mzali 
appointed Brig Gen Zine El Abidine Ben Ali as the director of national security 
within the Ministry of Interior. Despite contrary promises of the government, 
Ben Ali’s appointment led to more repressive policies and a security apparatus not 
dependent on emergency powers.49
Only on 14 January 2011, the day that President Ben Ali fled the country in 
the face of antigovernment protests, did he declare another state of emergency. 
Initially set indefinitely, this state of emergency was extended until October 
2013.50 After attacks on the American Embassy, the state of emergency was per-
petuated again on 5 October 2012.51 Until November 2012, the state of emer-
gency was extended only 30 days at the time. However, on 1 November the Tuni-
sian president prolonged it until January 2013—a fairly dangerous move, 
considering Tunisia’s current transitional process.52 According to political analyst 
Salah Eddine Jorchi, the decision was prompted by continuing social tension, gun 
smuggling from Libya to Tunisia, and risk to the tourist season.53 The continua-
tion of emergency powers in the summer of 2013 stemmed from an ongoing 
military struggle with Algeria against the Uqba Ibn Nafaa Brigade, a group with 
alleged ties to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, occupying a stronghold on 
Mount Chaambi.54
At the time of this writing, the state of emergency in Tunisia remains in ef-
fect in accordance with the interim constitution, which gives the president unlim-
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ited emergency powers that rely for checks and balances on mere consultation 
with the president of the National Constituent Assembly (NCA) and the prime 
minister (Article 11, paragraph 7).55 This regulation derived from the old consti-
tution (Article 46), adding only the limitation that the president was not allowed 
to dissolve the parliament or present a motion of censure against the govern-
ment.56
The NCA, together with six commissions, worked toward finalizing the con-
stitution. On 6 August 2013, the NCA suspended its work because of the political 
assassination of Mohammed Brahmi, a secular opposition member in the NCA, 
on 25 July 2013. His death constituted the second act of political assassination 
after the shooting of secular journalist Chokri Belaid on 6 February 2013, which 
led to a severe political crisis, a reshuffling in the government, and the resignation 
of Prime Minister Hamadi Jebali (Ennahda).57 These events have added to an 
already disputed legitimacy of the Tunisian draft constitution, caused in part by 
the inclusion of norms referring to Tunisia as an Islamic state, a failure to include 
reference to international law, and the NCA’s refusal to accept advice from its own 
expert commissions.58
Unfortunately, the draft constitution’s regulation concerning the state of 
emergency in its various forms throughout August 2012, December 2012, and 
June 2013 has seen a progressive deterioration, making it little different from the 
old constitution of 1957.59 As in the latter document, Article 79 of the draft 
constitution of June 2013 provided that before the president can declare a state of 
emergency, he must consult the president of the parliament and the prime minis-
ter. The advice of these two representatives of the legislative and executive, how-
ever, is not binding. What remains in the current draft is one additional element 
to its predecessor—namely, the right of the president of the parliament or two-
thirds of its members to refer the presidential emergency decree to the constitu-
tional court after a waiting period of at least 30 days. Put very clearly, this waiting 
period is twice as long as the one regulated by the 2007 constitution of Egypt. In 
addition, the two-thirds majority required in the parliament presents an unusually 
high hurdle. In combination, these regulations would render the mechanisms of 
temporal limitation and parliamentary control almost useless. Further, in combi-
nation with the mere consultative function of the prime minister and president of 
parliament before the declaration of an emergency, the current draft constitution 
remains quite vulnerable to misuse. The only positive side is that with the declara-
tion of an emergency, the parliament automatically goes into permanent session, 
potentially providing democratic control over the presidential emergency powers, 
thus counteracting the dissolution of the parliament by emergency powers (Ar-
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ticle 79, draft constitution of June 2013). Its effectiveness as a control mechanism 
remains doubtful.
Article 17 (draft constitution of June 2013) provides a legal basis for using 
the army in support of civil authorities in cases of emergency. This provision might 
become particularly problematic because use of the regular military within the 
country is generally a disputed topic in the literature.60 Below constitutional level, 
Decree 78-50 of 1978 regulates the details of state-of-emergency declarations 
and emergency powers.61
Even though Tunisia is not one of the prime suspects that misused the dec-
laration of a state of emergency, current constitutional reforms need to take a 
good look at the emergency regulations they want to become law. One must as-
certain why a state of emergency was not declared until 14 January 2011 in an 
extremely repressive security state that suffocated all potential resistance at its 
roots.62 Considering the newly gained freedoms of the Tunisian people, the prev-
alent political instability, the threat of political assassinations and terrorist attacks, 
and the deep rift between Islamist and secular factions, the new constitution must 
take particular precautions with regard to a new emergency system. It must do so 
because both the current and old constitutional regulations completely lacked any 
control mechanisms, viable time limitations, or other constraints to the declara-
tion and execution of emergency powers.
Conclusion
It is certainly not justified to state that all authoritarian regimes and less 
democratic states can impose states of emergency to their liking and without 
limitations. In general, one can distinguish between two rather clear-cut cases 
concerning the role of the state of emergency before, during, and—as it applies—
after the Arab Spring. Egypt, on the one hand, was under a permanent, long-term 
state of emergency used to curb civil and political rights and to strengthen and 
protect an unpopular government against popular demands. After the coup that 
removed Mubarak from power, the state of emergency was deemed necessary to 
provide increased security as a means of dealing with protests that emerged after 
a continuation of struggles between secular and Islamist political powers. Thus, 
pre–Arab Spring Egypt constitutes a strong case for the misuse of emergency 
powers over an extended period of time. On the other hand, Tunisia under Ben 
Ali used quite different repressive tools of control, such as a very invasive security 
apparatus and detention laws that made the declaration of states of emergency 
less relevant. Pre–Arab Spring Libya, run by the arbitrary rule of an individual 
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dictator, did not experience a legal, long-term state of emergency, which was not 
necessary due to the lack of a constitution.
When looking at how different constitutions formulate state-of-emergency 
laws, one finds quite diverse approaches. The Libyan 1951 constitution, just as the 
previous Egyptian constitutions, gives power to an individual—the king (and in 
Egypt, the president)—to declare an emergency and gives parliament the only 
real check against misuse. As it did before the revolution, Tunisia opted for a very 
ineffective consultation mechanism among president, prime minister, and presi-
dent of the parliament. In all three cases, the parliament plays a role in determin-
ing the continuation of the state of emergency. One can see the weakest role of a 
parliament in the current Tunisian draft constitution, which requires the president 
of parliament or two-thirds of its members to wait for 30 days before referring the 
decree to the constitutional court.
Independently of the eventual outcomes, the constitutional reform process 
in all countries—specifically and tangibly in Egypt and Tunisia—was accompa-
nied by a political fragility in which political assassinations and protests were able 
to destabilize new governments. In the above cases, one can identify several po-
tential dangers that might accompany the transitional periods induced or accom-
panied by states of emergency:63
1. Transitional state-of-emergency rule becomes permanent or reoccurring:
Mubarak’s rule, similar to the situation in Algeria, testifies to the danger 
of state-of-emergency regimes becoming permanent. Even though Egypt 
and Tunisia seem to be in the process of genuine reforms, the political 
instability caused by political fragmentation and factions trying to hijack 
or derail these reform processes might lead to instabilities that could 
prompt a more permanent emergency rule to continue.
2. Acknowledgement that liberal institutions might not be sufficient to deal
with reoccurring instabilities: Political assassinations and similarly desta-
bilizing events (terrorists in the Chaambi Mountains) could result in an 
overemphasis on powers of the executive, both in times of normalcy and 
emergency when redesigning the constitutions.
3. Utility of emergency powers for coups d’état and maintenance of power of
reactionary forces: The ambivalent role of Egypt’s military in intervening 
whenever it observes an unfavorable development must be observed with 
caution. Likewise, Algeria has experienced rule through emergency pow-
ers. Until the successful conclusion of a political and legal power transi-
tion, civil society will have to keep an eye open for attempts to seize power 
through events that would justify declaring the state of emergency anew.
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4. Legal and political imprints left behind by old constitutional arrangements: 
The suspension of Egypt’s 2012 constitution and the military installment 
of a new transitional regime threaten to delegitimize the reform processes. 
Tunisia’s perpetual state of emergency also weakens the popular legitimacy 
of the government. Furthermore, using the old constitutions as templates 
in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt might be a trust-instilling measure, but it 
risks perpetuating the weaknesses of the old constitutions. Like its Arab 
Spring brethren, Libya might use its 1951 constitution as a template. If it 
decides to do so, the introduction of functional Western and non-Western 
models of checks and balances will be necessary to reduce the likelihood 
of misuse of state-of-emergency powers. Libya might even opt for a federal 
system, which would transfer some emergency powers to the level of the 
provinces or states.
5. Individual abuses of emergency powers: Morsi’s presidential declaration,
with which he granted himself sweeping powers, remains a possibility in 
the 2012 constitution (see Article 131). Egypt has experienced the abuse 
of presidential powers, which causes the population to react with massive 
mobilization whenever it feels that the acts of presidents have gone too far. 
Consequently, installing a strong presidential system might not be advis-
able and could prove disadvantageous for legitimizing the position of 
presidents in Egypt’s future. The same might hold true for Libya.
Even if laws governing states of emergency seem well developed, the effec-
tiveness of checks and balances in controlling emergency powers strongly depends 
upon the political setup of the state (composition of the government, exclusive-
ness of the police, and appointment of judges). The experience before and after the 
Arab Spring resulted in concrete legal change in Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt. How-
ever, in terms of the important role that the state of emergency currently plays in 
Tunisia and how the constitutional draft might regulate it, Tunisia becomes a case 
of concern regarding the misuse of emergency powers. Similarly for Egypt, one 
can predict that, given the political volatility and the constitutional draft currently 
discussed, state-of-emergency declarations and violence exerted under the legal 
justification of emergency powers will continue to haunt the Egyptian people, 
who are already weary of constitutional dictatorships. As for the state-of-emer-
gency regulations becoming constitutional law in Libya, it is simply too early to 
make any predictions.
All current drafts and applicable constitutions—particularly the develop-
ment of norms regarding powers that belong to state-of-emergency regulations 
(including the aspects of derogations of civil liberties during times of urgency)—
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need close scrutiny. Because the current constitutional systems are extremely 
prone to misuse, careful revisions as laid out in the theoretical framework above 
are indispensable.
Most countries revise their constitutions continuously. There is no reason 
and no need to expect the perfect constitution within such a short period of time. 
However, the importance of completing the first round of reforms with a consti-
tution that preserves major liberties and is compatible with international law can-
not be overstated. This is why it is imperative that the public remain observant of 
the abuses of executive powers and demand amendments and reforms when it is 
necessary for the greater good of the peaceful coexistence of citizens.
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